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Abstract: Surveillance takes many shapes and forms and the experience of surveillance is often most intense in urban centers.
One of the historical roots of surveillance can be connected to the modern information base of tracking individuals for
economic and political reasons. Michel Foucault comments in more detail on one of the earliest examples of a surveillance
machine found in Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon. Surveillance has now become the solution of choice to ward off urban
fears and insecurities in today's megacities. Though its antecedents can be traced via Foucault's account of panoptic
discipline which walled in society's outcasts for rehabilitation, the following essay explores the shift to the urban panopticism
of today where society's outcasts are subtly filtered out of "public" view. Juxtaposing a sociological account of the
concentration camp with urban Disneyization fosters a greater understanding of how surveillance creates certain categories
of citizenship. In particular, how urban surveillance intensifies Walter Benjamin's description of the flâneur who often
experiences the brunt of surveillance's filtering power.
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SURVEILLANCE IS ONE of the mostcommon experiences we share today. Forinstance, let’s look at something as simple as
grocery shopping. Walking in, a TV above
your head let’s you know you’re on camera.
Checking out, if you use a debit card your purchase
is tracked. If you use a club card each item you buy
is tracked. If you’ve ever used online shopping for
instance, your first visit asks you for your club card
number. After entering it the website tells you
everything you’ve ever bought at that store.
Another common experience we all share to one
degree or another is the global renovation of urban
centers. For instance, I currently live in Manchester,
England, which was once a harbinger of the industrial
revolution. Now however, it has become a consumer
tourist center full of trendy shops, museums, theatres
and parks. Marshal Mcluhan prophesied this urban
transition as the shift from industry to Disneyland.
Some 40 years ago now, sitting in the patio of a NY
restaurant, he circled his finger around the
skyscrapers above his head and proclaimed: "of
course, a city like New York is obsolete. People will
no longer concentrate in great urban centers for the
purpose of work. New York will become a
Disneyland, a pleasure dome ... You're Gonna Love
Gothamland."1
What is often unnoticed however, is how the
Disneyization of cities like Manchester goes hand
in hand with surveillance. Surveillance is often billed
as a community building mechanism that will help
keep our cities safe and prosperous. What I want to
explore are the political and sociological antecedents
of the relationship between urban Disneyization and
surveillance. Though surveillance is being used in
Disneyland, it is also being used in concentration
and prison camps. However, the logic of surveillance
has been inverted as surveillance has developed from
concentration camps to what I will be calling Disney
camps. To understand urban surveillance more fully
I will briefly explicate the following five points:




• The Hidden Costs
Definitions of Surveillance
Firstly, when we are examining surveillance it’s
important to note that surveillance technologies are
focused on personal information. So being caught
on camera is one of a plethora of ways in which we
are tracked – for instance, DNA, fingerprints, retina
scans, voice recognition, shopping habits, body
mechanics (the way each person has a unique way
of moving based on their body’s mechanics, e.g.
bone lengths and joint constructions). Secondly, the
personal information being captured will be
surveillanced by a machine – that is, it’s mechanized.
As such it is part of what might more broadly be
1 Tom Wolfe, "Pleasure Principles," New York Times, June 12 2005.
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affiliated with the culture of modernity, or something
akin to what we might call the machine age.
One of the first machines used for surveillance
was an architectural building plan called the
panopticon. Jeremy Bentham was one of the first to
write about the panopticon which was essentially a
round building with an inner tower at its center. The
exterior of the building was made up of a series of
cells which all faced the central tower. The tower
was designed such that someone – a prison warden,
or an employer – could be in the tower and see
everyone working in the building from his or her
central vantage point. Crucially however, those in
the cells would not be able to see if anyone was in
the tower or not. Bentham had designed the windows
of the tower with a system of shutters so that
prisoners or employees wouldn’t be able to see if
anyone was watching. Bentham elatedly describes
his building as follows: “morals reformed – health
preserved – industry invigorated – instruction
diffused – public burdens lightened – Economy
seated as it were upon a rock – the Gordian knot of
the Poor-Laws not cut but untied – all by a simple
idea in Architecture!”2 Bentham wanted to reform
morals, make the economy more efficient, and had
an overarching political agenda which he believed
his machine/building could carry out in the most
efficient way possible.
Michel Foucault goes into more detail into the
way the panopticon worked by looking at the way it
shaped and influenced those who lived or worked in
the cells. The feeling of being watched had the
ultimate effect of fostering self-discipline in its
subjects. Because the experience of being watched
was unverifiable, those under the gaze of the tower
would police themselves. Because you might be seen,
you therefore had to discipline yourself. Foucault
argues that this means that the experience of
surveillance is interiorized: “an inspecting gaze, a
gaze which each individual under its weight will end
by interiorizing to the point that he is his overseer,
each individual thus exercising this surveillance over,
and against, himself.”3
This interiorization of the gaze creates a certain
kind of subjectivity, or to put it more broadly, fosters
a certain kind of citizenship. So surveillance, as it is
defined here, encompasses the various mechanized
ways individuals are catalogued and managed such
that they are aware of it, but unable to verify exactly
when it is taking place. This creates the internalized
sense in which individual people police themselves.
Political Correlations
The first thing I want to highlight is how the
mechanized analogies which were being employed
in the fields of physics and biology – e.g. Newtonian
physics – began to inform political theorists such as
Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As
such, there are important correlations that can be
drawn between their political theories and the
mechanized panopticism noted by Foucault. One of
the first and most influential articulations of
mechanized politics can be found in Thomas
Hobbes’s, Leviathan. Hobbes was the first to make
the shift from an Aristotelian understanding of human
beings as political animals, to the belief that human
beings were caught up in a political machine. In the
introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes draws the analogy
between a mechanized view of the human body with
the heart being like a spring in a clock, and the
political body, or commonwealth which in like
manner was seen as an autamata.4 Hobbes stands as
a crucial point in western political history because
of the influence of the shift he made. As Amos
Funkenstein puts it, “The most important political
thinkers since the seventeenth century did not reject
him outright even if they were profoundly irritated
by his claims. Instead, they absorbed the full force
of his arguments before transforming them into a
different, sometimes even a contrary, theory.”5
Such was the case with Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau disagreed with Hobbes’s account of
humanity as nasty and brutish6 and saw this as a
position skewed by a need to justify the rule of a
sovereign king. In contrast, Rousseau argued that
political problems such as corruption and coercive
uses of power are societal. The natural state of human
beings was essentially free. As he says, “man is born
free, and everywhere he is in chains.”7 Thus society
2 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon (London: Reprinted and sold by T. Payne, 1791). i-ii Full Title: or, the Inspection-House; containing the
idea of a new principle of construction applicable to any sort of establishment, in which persons of any description are to be kept under
inspection; and in Particular to Penitentiary-houses, Prisons, Houses of industry, Workhouses, Poor Houses, Manufacturies, Madhouses,
Lazarettos, Hospitals, and Schools; with a plan of management adopted to the principle; in a series of letters, written in the year 1787, from
Crechoff in White Russia, to a friend in England. First published: (1 volume, Dublin, Thomas Byrne, 1791; 2 volumes, London, T. Payne,
1791)
3 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980). 155
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904). xviii
5 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986). 327
6 “And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” Hobbes, Leviathan. 82
7 Jean J. Rousseau, The Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998). 5 First published
in 1762. it was censured early on.
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was enslaving human beings, and it was society that
ought to be changed. Hence, Rousseau’s emphasis
upon a social contract that individuals could agree
upon, and in all agreeing together, be ruled by the
sovereignty of their general will rather than a
sovereign king. Rousseau argues that when
individuals submit their particular wills to a general
will they become self ruled. In Rousseau’s words:
“In short, each giving himself to all, gives himself
to nobody.”8 Furthermore, if an individual breaks
the contract with the general will, because the rule
of all is the condition for freedom, the society as a
whole can legitimately compel an individual to be
free. Rousseau puts it this way: “In order then that
the social compact may not be an empty formula, it
tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can
give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey
the general will shall be compelled to do so by the
whole body. This means nothing less than that he
will be forced to be free; for this is the condition
which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures
him against all personal dependence. In this lies the
key to the working of the political machine; this
alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, without
it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most
frightful abuses.”9
However, in arguing for a social contract or the
sovereign rule of a general will, a catch 22 emerges
in Rousseau’s thought. Which comes first, the perfect
citizen who creates the perfect society or the perfect
society that pops out of the sky and forms the perfect
citizen?10 If the perfect society causes or draws out
inherent human goodness, then who starts it if society
is currently riddled with contradictions and evils?
Rousseau’s solution is to tentatively posit a
benevolent legislator who makes the laws that get
the ball rolling. The legislator is epitomized as a
dispassionate observer whose happiness does not
depend on the citizen’s practices but is distanced and
selfless.11 Rousseau says: “Thus we find
simultaneously in the work of legislation two things
that seem incompatible – an enterprise surpassing
human powers, and, to execute it, an authority that
is a mere nothing.”12 Both the dispassionate distance
of the legislator and the ideal of an authority that
functions according to a “nothing” or without the
exercise of real force are required by Rousseau so
that the legislator doesn’t become a sovereign power
himself.
Although Rousseau admits that his legislator
appears somewhat paradoxical if not completely
unrealistic in any way, I’d like to suggest that if we
return to the opening pages of Jeremy Bentham’s
Panopticon an interesting correlation can be
discerned. “Morals reformed – health preserved…
all by a simple idea in Architecture!”13 By a feat of
architecture, technology, and mechanization the
paradox of holding individual freedom and a
sovereign general societal will together is realized.
The general will becomes self-disciplined automata
under the panoptic gaze. The legislator is able to be
positioned in the center as the omniscient eye who
watches and enforces his law through the panoptic
element rather than coercive physical force.
Rousseau’s social contractualism beckons much
more detailed explication than I am offering, but the
implications of the conflation of Rousseauist political
theory and panopticism are crucial for our purposes
here. Surveillance atomizes individuals in order to
make them a collective. It has to atomize human
beings so that they can be identified positively,
whether in a cell, or, as in today’s surveillance
societies, on camera. As Foucault puts it, surveillance
“arrests or regulates movements; it clears up
confusions… it establishes calculated
distributions.”14 Because of the way panopticism
tracks and sorts, however, it is fundamentally
disinterested. These aspects of panopticism fit nicely
with the way Rousseau has to maintain
disinterestedness so that no one individual will be
ruled by another. Rather, in each individual giving
themselves to all, they rule themselves. The legislator
is the chief example of how this mechanized distance
is required. There can be no king for Rousseau.
Rather, the sovereignty of the king is internalized
into the contractual body of the machine. Rousseau
consistently argues for the rule of the general will of
all at the expense of the particular will of individuals.
8 Ibid. 15
9 Ibid. 18
10 Derek Matravers, "Introduction," in The Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998).
xiii
11 “In order to discover the rules of association that are most suitable to nations, a superior intelligence would be necessary who could see
all the passions of men without experiencing any of them; who would have no affinity with our nature and yet know it thoroughly; whose
happiness would not depend on us, and who would nevertheless be quite willing to interest himself in ours; and, lastly, one who, storing
up for himself with the progress of time a far-off glory in the future, could labor in one age and enjoy another. Gods would be necessary
to give laws to men.” Rousseau, The Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right. 40
12 Ibid. 42 Italics added.
13 Bentham, Panopticon. i-ii
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 219 For a
more current appropriation of this notion see also, Hille Koskela, "The Gaze without Eyes: Video Surveillance and the Changing Nature
of Urban Space," in Virtual Globalization: Virtual Spaces/Tourist Spaces, ed. David Holmes (London: Routledge, 2001). 137 where she
describes malls and consumer centers as exclusionary public spaces. See also Peter Marcuse, "Not Chaos, but Walls: Postmodernism and
the Partitioned City," in Postmodern Cities and Spaces, ed. Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 243ff
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Even when he tempers these statements with the
belief that the two wills should coincide, when
panopticism is employed alongside Rousseauist
political theory the combination can easily become
a self-justified mechanism used to “force individuals
to be free.”
Concentration Camps
Bentham actually struggled to get his building built
in the early nineteenth century, but the panopticon
did eventually take root in Western society. When
we look at the layout of many prisons or
concentration camps, the basic premise of panoptic
observation can be discerned. Zygmunt Bauman
postulates that the twentieth century may be
remembered as a century of camps.15 In his view the
holocaust, far from being an abnormality, was in fact
a continuation of the logic of modernity. In his
words: “Neither the Nazi nor the Communist vision
jarred with the audacious self-confidence and hubris
of modernity; they merely offered to do better, and
more ruthlessly (but more speedily in its result), what
other modern powers dreamed of, perhaps even tried,
but failed or did not have the guts to accomplish.”16
In orderly systematic fashion the Holocaust carved
strangers out as the abnormal dissidents of society,
corralled them into ghettos, and systematically
exterminated them. Camps were the Rousseauist
belief in order and perfect humanity brought into
brutal reality. The panopticon was used as the chief
means to force society’s outcasts to be free, and if,
as in the case of the Jews under Nazi rule, they could
not conform to the general will then they could be
discarded. Surveillance was employed to create the
general will and the great society not through the
logic of the dungeon, but through the logic of self-
discipline. The outcasts that were deemed not to
conform to the sovereign rule of all were separated
out for purification.
In order to understand surveillance in the form of
a concentration camp we need to look at the
experience of those under its gaze. What kind of
people are these camps shaping and influencing?
What status do citizens have in the concentration
camp? To answer these questions I want to explore
what Giorgio Agamben refers to as homo sacer - the
sacred human whom “the people have judged on
account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice
this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned
for homicide.”17 Homo sacer is a somewhat
paradoxical term in that it makes individual subjects
sacred, un-sacrificable, and yet open and bare before
the threat of death. Though Agamben’s interpretation
of this category is far from infallible,18 it represents
an interesting insight into the logic of the
concentration camp.19 The sovereign power of the
general will of the collective is formulated in the
workings of the panoptic machine which seeks to
ideologically inculcate individual subjects into its
whole. Each subject is related to each other like cogs
and springs designed to work together to produce
the perfect society for all at the expense of those
forced into the camp.
What is key about homo sacer however, is that
this term creates a space of exception, a no-man’s-
land where human life as a citizen is reduced to
biology. Thus biopolitics is born in the conflation of
bare life with sovereign power such that nothing
becomes impossible, nothing becomes illegal.20 This
helps make sense of how the holocaust, and in
Agamben’s latest work, Guantanimo Bay, can
become possible. Those under the panoptic gaze take
on a unique form of subjectivity. Those deemed to
be homo sacer, to be bare lives without humanity,
can, in the name of the general will, be “made to be
free” in a holy state of exception where “the care of
life coincides with the fight against the enemy.”21
Homo sacer, as the societal outcast, experiences the
full brunt of surveillant power concentrated in the
experience of the camp. The perfect society exists
outside the camp, made possible by the expulsion of
the outcasts who are being disciplined, rehabilitated,
interrogated, or simply removed, full stop. The
concentration camp represents one of the most
pervasive uses of surveillance over the past century
15 Zygmunt Bauman, The Bauman Reader, ed. Peter Beilharz, Blackwell Readers (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). 280 This is from
Bauman’s work Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). Bauman is not the only one to
make this connection, however his is an early account. See also Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans.
Daniel Heller-Roazan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). “Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental
biopolitical paradigm of the West.” 181
16 Bauman, The Bauman Reader. 274
17 “In the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be
considered a homicide.’ This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.” Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power
and Bare Life. 71 citing Pompeius Festus, On the Significance of Words. Sacer mons
18 Agamben himself notes the various interpretations offered for this term. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 71ff.
Those having read his work have in their own ways teased it out. See for instance Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real! (London:
Verso, 2002). 100ff, and John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, Radical Orthodoxy Series (New York: Routledge, 2003).
90ff
19 Agamben also explores the concentration camp as a dominant aspect of modern politics and life. See “The Camp as ‘Nomos’ of the
Modern” in Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 166ff
20 Ibid. 159
21 Ibid. 147
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and continues today, but it is at this point that I want
to turn to look at how the logic of the concentration
camp has morphed into today’s urban Disneylands.
Disney Camps
Urban life and culture have undergone dramatic
changes over the last fifty years. The cities of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were largely
industrial powerhouses of capitalist manufacturing.
Over time social patterns allowed people to move
from the center of cities out into suburban areas. As
the metropolitan area of cities expanded, industrial
businesses relocated and the inner cities slowly
disintegrated. The industrial center became dirty,
corrupt, crime ridden which only accelerated urban
flight.22 However, there have been a series of urban
renewal projects designed to rebuild and refurbish
new “fantasy cities.” Disneyland is by and large the
best correlate of this new urbanism. In fact, “Disney
parks have been taken to represent ‘a whole approach
to urban planning.’”23 The Disney approach has
produced museums, theatres, restaurants, and
shopping venues themed around experiential
entertainment like Hard Rock Café, Nike Town and
various other shopping venues like the West
Edmonton Mall24 and yes, downtown Manchester.
However, the Disneyization of urban centers
functions in the wake of the city’s dark and derelict
past. The rise of terrorism only compounds the
concerns new urban dwellers have when moving to,
and shopping within, the city center. In facing these
circumstances citizens and politicians alike have
tended to grab at the most economical and efficient
means of alleviating what Zygmunt Bauman calls
their “ambient fear.”25 The ambient fear works its
way out as an insatiable quest for safe clean
“community.” As a result, even though the Disney
city appears fantastical, chaotic and pluralistic
“underneath the chaos there are orders; the
fragmentation is not random.”26 And it is for these
reasons that surveillance is such a popular partner
of Disney cities.
David Lyon, a prominent commentator on
surveillance notes that the connection between
“Disneyization with surveillance is seldom made,
and yet this is the very mechanism that realizes the
power of social control. Disneyland itself is safe and
squeaky clean because it is patrolled by innocent
looking extras who maintain constant surveillance.”27
Various forms of surveillance watch and maintain
order in the Disney city and, as in gated communities
and shopping malls which are increasingly modeled
after principles of Disneyization,28 people
feudalistically pay for the protection of their land,
possessions and the “freedom” to consume.29 The
principles of consumerism have taken on particular
influence in shopping centers and cities modeled on
Disneyization. In many cities, “it is only residents’
capacity to consume that is viewed as in any sense
significant or important.”30 Once inside the confines
of the surveillanced space social theorists have found
that, “one must always look as if one has bought
something, or is about to buy,31 because presumed
non-customers (such as bag ladies, the homeless or
teenagers) ‘will be asked to move on or will be
thrown out.’32 The spaces of consumption become
‘aestheticized’ by exclusion33 and, as with the
22 This largely represents the use of “urban studies” as the study of the urban poor who couldn’t afford to flee into the suburbs. Cities in
this sense fit the modern concentration/internment camp scenario where the government built social housing for the socially disadvantaged
which created a central area for them to live and exist apart from everyone else. The great society was to be created by providing the spaces
for everyone to live. In Burgess’s account, for instance, he gives a neatly ordered centripetal pattern emanating out of the center of the city.
At its center is the factory zone, then the zone of transition, the zone of workingmen’s homes, the residential zone and finally at the perimeter
the commuters’ zone. Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," in The Blackwell City Reader, ed. Sophie Watson, Blackwell Readers
in Geography (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). 245
23 A Bryman, "The Disneyization of Society," The Sociological Review 47, no. 1 (1999). 27 citing S. Warren, "Disneyfication of the
Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle," Journal of Urban Affairs 16 (1994). 90
24 John Hannigan, "Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis," in Readings in Urban Theory, ed. Scott Campbell
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). 305-24. Here Hannigan outlines in more detail the various ways shopping, education, and restaurants
have all undergone radical restructuring around the principles of the theme park and fast food industries.
25 Bauman, The Bauman Reader. 205
26 Marcuse, "Not Chaos, but Walls: Postmodernism and the Partitioned City." 244
27 David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, Issues in Society (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002). 55-56
28 “The fastest growing type of ‘community’ in the United States is the gated community. Twenty-eight million Americans now live in
such areas. Over 30 percent of residential development in southern California is not in this form.” Timothy Gorringe, A Theology of the
Built Environment: Justice, Empowerment, Redemption (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 177
29 For a detailed description of the “embedded, preventative, subtle, co-operative” surveillance apparatuses used to control visitors to
Disneyworld see Clifford D. Shearing and Philip C. Stenning, "From the Panopticon to Disneyworld: The Development of Discipline," in
Perspectives in Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of John Ll.J. Edwards, ed. Anthony N. Doob (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1984). 342ff
30 Bryman, "The Disneyization of Society." 27 citing Warren, "Disneyfication of the Metropolis: Popular Resistance in Seattle."
31 R. Shields, "Social Spatialization and the Built Environment: The West Edmonton Mall," Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 7 (1989). 160
32 D. R. Judd, "The Rise of the New Walled Cities," in Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory, ed. D. C. Perry
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995). 149
33 N. Duncan, "Renegotiating Gender and Sexuality in Public and Private Spaces," in Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender
and Sexuality, ed. N. Duncan (London: Routledge, 1996). 129
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disembodied experience of much telecommunication
today, the urban experience in the mall is sanitized
and ‘purified.’”34,35 The Disneyized city no longer
holds to the vision of the general will of all, but
rather has settled for the safe community for those
who are willing to act and look the part of consumer
tourist. The various surveillant apparatuses still exist
as they did in the modern internment camps, but now
individual subjects choose to enter and be watched
in the hopes that the presence of the camera and
sensors will protect them from the strangers and
outcasts they fear.
What I want to make explicit at this point is how
the logic of panopticism has been inverted in this
new urbanism. The social outcasts are no longer
quarantined off to be rehabilitated in an intensified
experience of surveillant self-discipline. Rather, if
the social outcasts don’t fit the profile the camera is
looking for then they are simply filtered out of view.
The mechanization of surveillance is no longer for
the outcast, homo sacer. Rather, the perfect society
for all has been replaced by the safe society for the
consumer elite who can afford to maintain a presence
in camp Disney.
As with concentration camps, to understand them
fully we need to look at the forms of citizenship
being fostered in camp Disney. To this end, I want
to suggest that in this new urbanism homo sacer
becomes “the invisible flâneur.”36 The flâneur is the
wanderer who experiences the alienation of the city
in an intensified way. Instead of playing the game
according to the rules of the machine, he becomes
the man of the street. In Elizabeth Wilson’s
discussion of the flâneur she picks up on Walter
Benjamin’s study of Charles Baudelaire.37
“Baudelaire aligned himself with all the marginals
of society – with the prostitutes, the ragpickers, the
drunkards. It is not unusual for a rebel of his class
to identify with the ‘lumpen’ part of society.”38 The
flâneur is in some ways a less threatening way to
name the homo sacer of the concentration camp. He
wanders due to the isolation and anomie he
experiences. He doesn’t fit the norms. His life is one
of marginalization. Paradoxically, by their nature the
flâneurs seek out the crowd in order to secure their
own isolation.39 Ironically this is the crime for which
they are most guilty in camp Disney. Rather than
become special or concentrated inside a camp, they
are pushed to the margins and made invisible outside
them. If they will not conform to the panoptic
machine then they will be relegated from the gaze
altogether. Crucially, the inverted panopticism of
camp Disney intensifies the isolation and anomie of
the flâneur.
The Hidden Costs
“Safety, security and social order are all seen by most
people as positive accomplishments. Who would not
wish to walk without fear on a street after dark?”40
Urban centers are often reliant upon tourism and
consumerism which in turn relies on wealthy middle-
upper class people entering the city with the feeling
of safety and security. We live in a world of terrorism
and real crime that cannot be overlooked and must
be taken seriously. City councils and local
governments are therefore under pressure to provide
the mechanisms necessary to ensure the security of
urban spaces. As a result, surveillanced boundaries
are being seamlessly extended throughout
metropolitan areas. However, because governments
often collude with the private sector to procure these
goals,41 new categories of citizenship are being
informed by the values of consumer tourism. In the
quest for the freedom and safety to consume,
individual subjects attempt to maintain a presence
in the invisibly surveillanced zones of camp Disney.
Those who fit the profile stay and remain “free.”
Those who don’t are simply filtered into no-man’s-
lands beyond the camera’s view.42
34 D. Sibley, Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West (London: Routledge, 1995). 78
35 Koskela, "The Gaze without Eyes: Video Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space." 137
36 Elizabeth Wilson, "The Invisible Flâneur," in Postmodern Cities and Spaces, ed. Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
37 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. H. Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973).
38 Wilson, "The Invisible Flâneur." 73
39 “The flâneur only seems to break through this ‘unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest’ by filling the hollow space created in
him by such isolation, with the borrowed – and fiction – isolation of strangers…. ‘The pleasure of being in a crowd is a mysterious expression
of the enjoyment of the multiplication of numbers.’” Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. 58 citing
Charles Baudelaire and Y. G. Le Dantec, Oeuvres, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Paris: Biblioteque de la Pleiade, 1931). 626
40 Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. 53
41 See for instance Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990). Where he discuses the Haagen
Development firm’s redevelopment of the Martin Luther King Jr. Center in Watts district of Los Angeles. Following the completion of the
King Center “he won the bid for the $120 million refurbishing and expansion of the Crenshaw Plaza in Baldwin Hills, followed by a County
contract to create a shopping complex in the Willowbrook area just south of Watts. In each case the guarantee of fail-safe physical security
was the sine qua non in persuading retailers and franchises (and their insurers) to take up leases.” 242. Davis points out the way in which
local governments play a key role in colluding with private industry to create these surveillant centers. See also Lyon, Surveillance Society:
Monitoring Everyday Life. 61
42 You can find these no-man’s-lands in most major cities around the world. Throughout most urban centers you find pockets of undeveloped
un-Disneyized sections where outsiders congregate. Sometimes these are clear ghettos like Skid Row in LA, but also the fenced off sections
or condemned buildings, alleyways or under bridges.
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In the process of Disneyization, urban centers are
fast becoming blinding simulacra – a matrix of
images, symbols and glass that give the appearance
of transparency when in fact they blind urban citizens
from the dystopic life of the flâneur. Safe clean
“‘community’ is nowadays another name for paradise
lost - but one to which we dearly hope to return, and
so we feverishly seek the roads that may bring us
there.”43 But at what cost? Surveillance apparatuses
are being employed in ever greater numbers and in
ever diverse ways in camp Disney and I’d like to
suggest that the hidden cost is filtered out of view.
Do we still have an obligation to the outcasts we
cannot see? Can we develop further strategies of
integration which counter the fragmenting nature of
urban surveillance? Of course the answers to these
questions are beyond the scope of what can be
accomplished in an essay such as this, but I hope that
any future conversations will take into account the
political and social ideologies that current uses of
surveillance entail.
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